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An important issue within the present economic crisis is understanding the dynamics of the
public debt of a given country, and how the behavior of average consumers and tax payers in that
country affects it. Starting from a model of the average consumer behavior introduced earlier by the
authors, we propose a simple model to quantitatively address this issue. The model is then studied
and analytically solved under some reasonable simplifying assumptions. In this way we obtain a
condition under which the public debt steadily decreases.
PACS numbers: 89.65Gh
I. INTRODUCTION
Understanding consumption is a key issue in macroe-
conomics. The links between individual consumption de-
cisions and outcomes for the whole economy have been
deeply investigated by A. Deaton [1], who was awarded
the Nobel prize in 2015 [2]. In fact, since the begin-
ning, research focused on the relation between income
(and the interest rate) and consumption. Within this
framework, Friedman’s permanent income hypothesis [3]
and Modigliani’s life-cycle theory [4–6] contributed to
suggest how income variables might enter the consump-
tion function. In particular life-cycle theory provides a
useful framework for thinking about saving and related
mechanism, and paves the way for undestanding the link
between saving and growth of a country. Furthermore,
the theory predicts that saving rates are higher in more
rapidly growing economies, even in the short run, there-
fore establishing a correlation between growth and sav-
ings rates. However, more recent studies pointed out
that the range of applicability of the above mechanism is
quite limited [7–10], so that it alone does not succeed in
explaining the international correlation between saving
and economic growth.
Macroeconomists and policy-makers have traditionally
been concerned with the issue of the sustainability of
public debt in developing and emerging market countries.
However, starting from the appearance of the global fi-
nancial crisis, the attention has been shifted to developed
economies, which suffer from rising debt-Gross Domestic
Product (GDP) ratios in the face of stagnant or con-
tracting output. As a matter of fact, in most European
countries debt is at an unprecedented level in the last
fifty years. In some cases, the increases since 2007 have
exceeded 20 percentage points of GDP while the level of
the debt was already high [11].
The correct definition and measurement of public debt
were given by [12, 13]. The relation between public debt
and economic growth is the object of much work today
[14–19]. If debt growth rates are lower than those of
GDP, the debt is not bad. The economic growth restores
the income part of the budget, which is used to pay inter-
est on debt. Vice versa, with low economic growth rates,
public debt becomes a serious macroeconomic problem
for the country. In such a case governments have to pay
a large amount of public revenue to the creditors, which
results in fewer resources for education and public in-
vestments. An unsustainable level of debt is obtained in
correspondence to a high debt to GDP ratio [18]. In par-
ticular, interest rates rise on the basis of a greater prob-
ability of a default on debt obligations, with a negative
influence on private investment and consumption. The
debt-relief Laffer curve [20] provides information about
the negative impact of high debt on output growth; in
particular a point can be found, where outstanding debt
is so large that output growth gets reduced and the prob-
ability of debt repayment lowers. In this scenario, infla-
tion could be a viable solution to the government debt
problem [21, 22], while the effectiveness of fiscal consoli-
dation and of austerity requirements, such as the reduc-
tion in governments expenditure, is widely debated (see
e.g. [11] and references therein).
Actually, new provisions in the Stability and Growth
Pact (SGP) require European countries with a debt to
GDP ratio higher than 60 per cent to act to decrease it
in the next few years. It is thus important to assess under
which conditions this is possible. This is the purpose of
the present paper, in which a simple model is proposed
to try to find such conditions.
Since the model uses the representative agent frame-
work, it is subject to all its limitations, as it does not take
into account the differences between individuals. The use
of the representative agent in economy has been criticized
mainly in [23]. Progress in providing alternatives to the
ad hoc assumptions of the representative agent approach
has recently been made by using the tools of Statistical
Mechanics (see e.g. [24] and references therein).
Another related limiting aspect of the present analysis
concerns the absence of private enterprises in this sce-
nario. In fact, the presence of this type of agent can
generate earnings that can substantially help in paying
back public debt. However, if we assume that the eco-
nomic behavior of private enterprises can be included in
the representative agent picture, the present model could
2be still adopted in this more general setting.
In a previous paper [25] the authors proposed a sim-
ple mathematical model, based on a hydrodynamic ana-
log, to quantitatively describe the time evolution of the
amount of money an average consumer decides to spend,
depending on his/her available budget. In the present
paper we couple this model, or better, its difference equa-
tion version, to the standard equation for the time evo-
lution of the public debt given in ref. [12]. The resulting
dynamical model is then analytically solved under some
reasonable simplifying assumptions. The result is a range
of the parameters of the model for which the public debt
steadily decreases. The model is presented in Section 2,
and its dynamics is studied in Section 3. Finally, in Sec-
tion 4, some conclusions are drawn, and some comments
and perspectives of our work are outlined.
II. THE MODEL
The typical strategy adopted by a Government to de-
crease its public debt is to burden the average consumer
with additional taxation, which may also be applied to
the amount of money present, at a certain date, on the
consumer’s bank account. Let us write the tax payed by
a single average consumer in the k-th year by
τk = αpa + βδkmbk + γck, (1)
where pa is the yearly income, which we assume fixed, bk
is the average yearly bank deposit, and ck is the yearly
expenditure of the consumer. α, β and γ are the aver-
age taxation rates for these quantities, respectively. The
Kronecker delta δkm picks a fraction of the amount bk
only in the m-th year.
The dynamics of the public debt Dk. calculated at the
year k and normalized to the number N of consumers, is
described by the difference equation [12]
gk + rDk−1 = τk +Dk −Dk−1, (2)
where Dk − Dk−1 is the yearly pro capite deficit at the
time k, r is the fixed rate of return on public and private
debts, gk is the pro capite amount of money the State
utilizes for funding education, health, welfare, and all
public activities. Plugging (1) into (2) we get
Dk − (1 + r)Dk−1 = gk − αpa − βbkδkm − γck (3)
To describe the behavior of the consumer we may adopt
the leaking bucket model [25]:
bk − bk−1 = yk − ck (4)
where yk is the expendable part of the salary, i.e. yk =
pa − τk. Substituting this definition into (4), we get
pa − (αpa + βδkmbk + γck)− ck = bk − bk−1 (5)
Substituting ck = ab
2
k as in [25]
1 we get
(1 + γ)ab2k + (1 + βδkm)bk − bk−1 = (1− α)pa. (6)
This equation should of course be coupled to the public
debt evolution equation (3). Let us now study the latter
with the simplifying assumption gk = g0 = const. and
the functional relation ck = ab
2
k:
Dk − (1 + r)Dk−1 = (g0 − αpa)− βbkδkm − γab
2
k (7)
or
Dk = (1 + r)Dk−1 +∆k (8)
where we defined ∆k = (g0−αpa)−βbkδkm− γab
2
k. The
solution of this difference equation is
Dk = (1 + r)
k
[
D0 +
k∑
i=1
∆i
(1 + r)i
]
(9)
The sum in the above equation is
Sk =
k∑
i=1
∆i
(1 + r)i
(10)
= (g0 − αpa)
(1 + r)k − 1
r(1 + r)k
− γa
k∑
i=1
b2i
(1 + r)i
−
βbm
(1 + r)m
so that
Dk = (1 + r)
k
[
D0 + (g0 − αpa)
(1 + r)k − 1
r(1 + r)k
−γa
k∑
i=1
b2i
(1 + r)i
−
βbm
(1 + r)m
]
(11)
In the above two equations it is understood that the last
term is present only if k ≥ m. We notice that the first
equality in eq. (10) is similar to the formula for the price
of a coupon bond [26].
Therefore, following this model, we can argue that the
Government choice of the values of α, β, γ and m affects
both the average consumer’s budget according to Eq. (6),
and the public debt evolution, as specified in (11).
III. MAXIMUM STATE EXPENSE IN PAYING
BACK PUBLIC DEBT
In this section we study the dynamics governed by Eqs.
(6) and (11) under some specific simplifying assumptions.
First of all, we exclude the possibility of direct taxation
of the amount bk, so that β = 0. Also, we take α = γ,
1 we assume that all consumers have no debts, i.e. a positive
budget, cfr. [25]
3since in many countries these rates are in fact quite close.
In this way, Eqs. (6) and (11) get rewritten respectively
as
(1 + α)ab2k + bk − bk−1 = (1− α)pa (12)
and
Dk = (1 + r)
kD0 + (g0 − αpa)
(1 + r)k − 1
r
(13)
−αa(1 + r)k
k∑
n=1
b2n
(1 + r)2
.
In Fig.1 we show the dynamics of the consumer budget
described by Eq.(12), where we set a = 0.15 and pa =
100, and we assume that α = 0.25, as is reasonable for
an average consumer in a european country. We notice
that the fixed point bλ = 20 is reached after few steps.
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FIG. 1: Consumer’s budget dynamics described by Eq.(12)
for α = 0.25, a = 0.15 and pa = 100, for the initial conditions
b0 = 18 (continuous line), b0 = 20 (dotted line) and b0 = 22
(dashed line).
Let us find the fixed point of Eq.(12). The condition
bλ+1 = bλ gives
bλ =
√
1− α
1 + α
pa
a
(14)
Assuming that the average consumer does indeed start
with an initial budget close to bλ, we may rewrite Eq.
(13) as follows
Dk = (1 + r)
kD0 + (g0 − αpa)
(1 + r)k − 1
r
−αa(1 + r)kb2λ
k∑
n=1
1
(1 + r)n
= (1 + r)kD0 +
(
g0 −
2αpa
1 + α
)
(1 + r)k − 1
r
(15)
The public debt starts decreasing if there is some value of
k such that Dk+1 < Dk. This implies the k−independent
relation
pa >
1 + α
2α
(rD0 + g0). (16)
If this condition is met, then, a k−independent decrease
of the public debt is possible, therefore reducing the debt
to GDP ratio, as required by SGP. For example, in a
country where α = 1/4, r = 1/20, Eq. (16) reads
pa >
5
2
(
D0
20
+ g0
)
. (17)
If D0/20≪ g0, we have pa > 2.5g0, which indicates that
the value of g0 cannot be higher of (2/5)pa, in order to
have decreasing values of Dk for k > 1.
This result tells that decreasing the salaries and wages
of consumers may not be the right choice for a govern-
ment to reduce the public debt.
IV. THE ROˆLE OF THE PUBLIC
EXPENDITURE
In this section we consider our model under some more
general assumptions. In particular we relax the assump-
tion that the public expenditure gk is constant. Moreover
we consider a more general income-expenditure relation
for the consumer, i.e.
ck = anb
n
k , n ≥ 2, (18)
where we excluded a linear behavior in order to model
the existence of a threshold. In this case the stable fixed
point is given by
bλ =
n
√
1− α
1 + α
pa
a
. (19)
Assuming as above that the consumer is in proximity of
this fixed point we get, in place of Eq. (15):
Dk = (1 + r)
kD0 −
2α
(1 + α)r
pa
[
(1 + r)k − 1
]
+(1 + r)k
k∑
i=1
gi
(1 + r)i
. (20)
Notice that the assumption of being at the fixed point
has again erased the dependence on the coefficient an.
The condition Dk+1 < Dk in this case gives
2αpa
1 + α
> g1 + rD0 +
k−1∑
j=1
gj+1 − gj
(1 + r)j
, (21)
where g1 is the expenditure at year 1. Let us now assume
that the expenditure in the subsequent years has the form
gj = (j − 1)∆G+ g1 (22)
where g1 > 0. In this way gj+1 − gj = ∆G, so that
the sign of ∆G determines wether the public expenditure
grows or decreases over the years. The condition (23)
then specializes to
2αpa
1 + α
> g1 + rD0 +∆G
(1 + r)k−1 − 1
r(1 + r)k−1
, (23)
4where k ≥ 1. For |∆G| ≪ g1 the last term in the rhs
is negligible, therefore our conclusions of the previous
section are still valid.
V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, building on a simple quantitative de-
scription of the behavior of an average consumer over a
brief period [25], and on Barro’s theory of the public debt
[12], we propose a model for the description of the influ-
ence of the former on the dynamics of the public debt,
with the aim of establishing the condition for its decrease.
Our result are clearly limited in scope by the use of the
concept of average consumer and by the fact that it is
valid only over a short period. We obtained analytical
results under the simplifying assumptions of equal aver-
age taxation rates for the yearly income and expenditure
of the consumer, respectively. Furthermore the possibil-
ity of direct taxation of consumer’s average yearly bank
deposit has been excluded. Besides extending the model
to overcome its shortcomings, it would be interesting to
further relax the above simplifying assumptions and see
when and how the condition we found gets enhanced.
An interesting issue to investigate is how the above
results would get modified by generalizing the leaking
bucket model for the average consumer behavior [25], in
such a way to include the effect of different goods on the
level of consumer demand.
Another interesting generalization of the present model
could be the inclusion of private enterprises as a different
agent in the economic landscape.
The proposed model could finally be rephrased in
terms of the debt to GDP ratio in order to study the
impact of fiscal consolidations on public debt dynamics
and how it is related to fiscal multipliers [11].
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